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NOTE: EXPLORING THE PROMISE AND 
POTENTIAL OF A WTO ANTI-
CORRUPTION TREATY 
CHRISTINE E. DRYDEN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Laws criminalizing foreign bribery are under-enforced. Efforts to reduce 
foreign bribery have resulted in increased awareness of the problems of 
corruption, widely-agreed-upon treaties, and domestic legislation. Despite this, 
anti-bribery laws often exist only on the books; they are not actively enforced. A 
new treaty, negotiated at the World Trade Organization (WTO), could improve 
enforcement. Despite the recent failure of multilateral trade negotiations at the 
WTO,1 the WTO would likely still provide an effective forum for plurilateral 
agreements. The WTO is an appropriate forum for an anti-bribery treaty because 
corruption and anti-corruption efforts affect trade, and anti-corruption efforts 
align with the WTO’s goals of promoting transparency and good governance. The 
proposed treaty could improve enforcement because it would include not only 
legislative and preventive obligations similar to those in other anti-corruption 
treaties but also substantive enforcement obligations. And, because it would be 
negotiated at the WTO, it would come with an international forum for resolving 
disputes and, therefore, for enforcing enforcement. The enforcement obligations 
proposed by this note include criteria that have already been used to assess 
whether states are enforcing anti-bribery laws. These more specific requirements 
should make compliance clearer and breach more obvious and thus easier to 
prove. Further, this note addresses which actors would have standing to sue at 
the WTO. It also suggests possible remedies for breach and discusses how to 
calculate the level of nullification and impairment for those remedies. 
Part II of this note describes why a new anti-bribery treaty is necessary. Part 
III recommends the WTO as a forum for this treaty. Part IV discusses existing 
anti-corruption treaties and the substantive requirements of the treaty proposed 
by this note. Part V addresses which actors would have standing to sue, describes 
how a claim of breach would proceed, and suggests possible remedies. Part VI 
concludes. 
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1.  Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/global-trade-after-the-failure-of-the-doha-round.html. 
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II 
FILLING THE INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT VOID: THE NEED FOR A NEW 
ANTI-CORRUPTION TREATY 
Though once perceived as the “cost of doing business,” bribery is now seen 
as detrimental to an efficient global economy.2 Having a stable and accountable 
government that can maintain a growing, market-based economy becomes more 
difficult when government officials receive side payments. Without more 
vigorous enforcement measures in place, undesirable, yet persistent, abuses of 
the law will continue unhindered, and crime will continue to pay. Thus, to reduce 
corruption, the cost of doing business corruptly must be raised.3 This can be 
achieved by threatening the supplier of the bribe with sanctions, fines, or criminal 
prosecutions. Because corruption has been recognized as harmful to the 
economy, anti-corruption has become the subject of domestic legislation and 
international treaties.4 
What the current international anti-corruption program lacks is enforcement. 
Much of the world seems to agree that corruption is not only morally repugnant 
but also economically inefficient.5 Regional and international treaties condemn 
corruption. Yet these treaties fail to provide an international enforcement 
mechanism, leaving enforcement solely to the domestic mechanisms.6 As a result, 
anti-corruption laws are under-enforced.7 A new anti-corruption treaty with an 
enforcement mechanism could improve enforcement and thus reduce corruption. 
Because the WTO already has a forum for enforcing its rules, it could be an 
effective organization under which to negotiate this new treaty. 
Two existing anti-corruption treaties will be discussed—the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention). 
Both suffer from the same problem—domestic enforcement only.8 The OECD 
 
 2.  See Susan Rose-Ackerman, International Actors and the Promises and Pitfalls of Anti-
Corruption Reform, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 447, 454 (2013) (describing corruption as hindering efficient 
markets). 
 3.  See Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 413, 436 (2007) (assuming that corporations are rational actors that would weigh the costs and benefits 
of bribery). 
 4.  See, e.g., United Nations Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 
[hereinafter UNCAC]; Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/ 
contents [https://perma.cc/N6XV-YN9M].  
 5.  Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organization, 28 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 305, 321–22 (1997). 
 6.  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 474. 
 7.  See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 84, 93, 106 (2014) (most states parties to the OECD Convention do not 
enforce, or hardly enforce their foreign anti-bribery laws). 
 8.  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Introduction: The Role of International Actors in Fighting Corruption, 
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 3, 24 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013). 
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publishes regular monitoring reports, but this “name-and-shame” method of 
sanctioning signatories does not seem to be especially effective.9 The degree to 
which a state is required to enforce its anti-corruption laws is ambiguous, and 
enforcement levels are correspondingly low.10 Though states parties have largely 
complied with obligations to enact domestic anti-bribery laws, they might have 
an incentive not to enforce them.11 This is because permitting their corporations 
and individuals to bribe could help states win business abroad.12 Rational parties 
will analyze the cost of bribery in comparison with the rate of detection and 
behave accordingly. If penalties or chances of detection remain low, rational 
actors might conclude that crime will pay.13 Assuming that persons and 
corporations that contemplate bribing foreign officials are rational actors, they 
are likely to bribe foreign officials when, as is currently the case, the cost of 
bribing a foreign official is quite low considering the odds of ever being 
prosecuted.14 
Despite incentives to do otherwise, a few states actively enforce anti-bribery 
laws.15 These states include the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Switzerland.16 Most states parties to the OECD Convention do not enforce 
their anti-bribery laws or enforce them minimally.17 And the handful of states 
actively enforcing the anti-bribery laws probably do not compensate for the states 
not enforcing those laws. For example, though the United States sometimes 
prosecutes foreign corporations, it mostly prosecutes its own corporations for 
foreign bribery.18 
Despite potential for lack of enforcement or uneven enforcement, the 
situation in which some states actively and broadly enforce treaty obligations 
while others do not enforce them at all might actually improve enforcement.19 
Treaties allow states that want to enforce the treaty to exercise broader 
jurisdictional grounds than are typically acceptable.20 Thus, those states can more 
easily enforce the treaty for other states parties.21 As a result, overall enforcement 
is improved not only because of the enforcing state’s direct actions, but also (at 
least in the case of foreign bribery) because the enforcing state’s actions 
encourage other states to increase their own enforcement efforts.22 
 
 9.  See id. at 23. 
 10.  Brewster, supra note 7, at 106. 
 11.  Id. at 100–01. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Delaney, supra note 3, at 436. 
 14.  Id.   
 15.  Thomas J. Bussen, Midnight in the Garden of Ne Bis in Idem: The New Urgency for an 
International Enforcement Mechanism, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 485, 496 (2015). 
 16.  Brewster, supra note 7, at 106. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 107. 
 19.  Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 297, 301–02 (2015). 
 20.  Id. at 317. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 330. 
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However, that a few states vigorously prosecute bribery and most others 
hardly prosecute it at all might be causing more of a twofold problem of both too 
much and too little prosecution.23 When a state (often, the United States) brings 
an anti-bribery case against a corporation, that corporation might at some point 
admit guilt.24 This admission could occur as a result of conviction or as part of a 
settlement.25 Unlike in U.S. domestic law, there is no bar against double jeopardy 
in international law.26 Once a corporation admits guilt in one state, other states 
can free ride on this admission to reap the rewards of imposing monetary 
sanctions on this corporation.27 
Spotty enforcement is not helping anyone, except perhaps corrupt 
governments who can still get investment from non-enforcing states.28 A treaty 
with an international enforcement mechanism could benefit many actors. The 
economic inefficiencies of corruption would be reduced as corruption is reduced. 
And this system could benefit those states that do not actively enforce anti-
bribery laws due to limited resources rather than limited enthusiasm, because 
international enforcement obligations would provide political cover for enforcing 
anti-corruption laws.29 
III 
THE WTO’S INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGES AS A FORUM FOR THE NEW 
TREATY 
Transnational anti-corruption efforts can be classified as part of international 
trade law, because anti-corruption treaties and related domestic legislation affect 
how trade is conducted.30 The WTO would therefore be an appropriate forum for 
a new anti-corruption treaty. It already has an established enforcement 
mechanism, and its goals align with the aims of reducing corruption. The WTO’s 
goals include reducing barriers to trade.31 The goals of anti-corruption include 
“efficient international markets”32 and economic growth.33 Indeed, corruption 
may function as a barrier to trade.34 Like a tariff, corruption requires an exporting 
country to pay extra.35 And corruption can block competition, resulting in a 
 
 23.  Bussen, supra note 15, at 509. 
 24.  Id. at 500. 
 25.  See id. (guilt often admitted as part of settlement in the United States). 
 26.  Id. at 498. 
 27.  Id. at 501. 
 28.  See id. at 507. 
 29.  Id. at 512. 
 30.  Eric C. Chaffee, From Legalized Business Ethics to International Trade Regulation, 65 MERCER 
L. REV. 701, 705–08 (2014); id. at 722–23. 
 31.  Understanding the WTO: What We Stand For, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm [https://perma.cc/WD8V-PZVL]. 
 32.  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8, at 15. 
 33.  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 455. 
 34.  Nichols, supra note 5, at 333–34. 
 35.  Id. 
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monopoly for certain favored corporations.36 Corruption also increases the cost 
of public works and diverts money from citizens at large to corrupt officials.37 The 
WTO promotes transparency and good governance.38 “[C]orruption is a 
symptom of a poorly functioning government,”39 and its source is secrecy.40 Thus, 
reducing corruption and increasing transparency go hand in hand. 
A formal enforcement requirement and the WTO forum offer many benefits. 
To deter bribery, not only does the cost of corruption need to be high, but the 
cost of honesty needs to be correspondingly low; it must be beneficial to behave 
honestly.41 The cost of honesty would be low if many states were truly compelled 
to follow anti-bribery laws. This is an advantage of the WTO. Many states are 
members,42 so an individual state would not have reason to suspect that it is in 
the minority in enforcing its anti-bribery laws. And because the WTO has a 
preexisting dispute resolution entity—the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM)—at which noncompliant states can be sued, each state can feel confident 
that other states are enforcing their anti-corruption laws.43 Furthermore, the 
WTO wants to make the rules of trade “transparent and predictable.”44 Anti-
corruption obligations will help achieve these goals by eliminating disguised and 
informal additional costs of trade. 
Currently, a multilateral agreement of the entire WTO membership seems 
unlikely.45 However, an anti-corruption treaty need not be multilateral; it could 
be effective as a plurilateral46 agreement. The treaty proposed here targets the 
supply side47 of foreign bribery and, like the OECD Convention, requires the 
participation of significant exporters to be useful. Because the OECD 
Convention has an effective membership but an ineffective enforcement 
mechanism, this treaty could have more or less the same membership as the 
 
 36.  Id. at 335. 
 37.  Paul Sarlo, The Spaghetti Bowl Revisited in the Context of Corruption: Understanding How 
Corrupt Countries Could Subvert the WTO’s Rule-Oriented System Through Preferential Trade 
Agreements, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 9–10 (2014).  
 38.  Padideh Ala’i, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 259, 
260 (2008). 
 39.  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 456. 
 40.  Ala’i, supra note 38, at 278. 
 41.  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 460. 
 42.  Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7B57-56SV].  
 43.  See Brewster, supra note 7, at 106 (explaining that when states are not confident that other states 
are actually enforcing their anti-corruption laws, they are likely to also not enforce anti-corruption laws). 
 44.  Chaffee, supra note 30, at 724 (quoting What Is the WTO? Who We Are, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm [https://perma.cc/K3TZ-NEQD]).  
 45.  See Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, supra note 1 (describing the failure of 
the Doha Round and the unlikeliness of a multilateral agreement in the near future). 
 46.  That is, a treaty among less than all the members. Understanding the WTO: Plurilaterals, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm [https://perma.cc/HWP9-6LBW]. 
 47.  The supply side of bribery means the corporations and individuals paying bribes. The demand 
side means the government officials receiving the bribes. On the supply and demand side of bribery, see 
Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2012). 
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OECD Convention (that is, the significant capital exporters48 among the WTO 
membership and certainly less than the entire WTO membership). It is the 
presence of the WTO’s well-respected enforcement mechanism—not an increase 
in states parties to anti-corruption treaties—that will result in increased 
enforcement and reduced corruption. 
Although the WTO does not directly deal with corruption,49 it might already 
be moving toward addressing it. Indirectly, the WTO appears, but does not claim, 
to be on a path to rejecting corruption.50 For example, In US—Gambling,51 the 
United States defended its prohibition against internet gambling partially “on the 
ground that internet gambling would benefit organized crime and facilitate fraud 
and corruption,”52 under the public morals exception.53 Furthermore, the WTO’s 
Revised Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) seems to recognize that 
the WTO has the potential to deal with corruption, at least in the state action 
realm of government procurement.54 According to the Revised GPA, a state 
“shall conduct . . . procurement in a transparent and impartial manner that . . . 
prevents corrupt practices.”55 The Revised GPA is a plurilateral agreement, not 
binding on the entire membership, so it should not be interpreted as too strongly 
supporting the existence of a WTO anti-corruption agenda.56 But it seems to at 
least suggest that corruption is a topic the WTO could address.57 
Various possible roles for the WTO in anti-corruption have been suggested. 
Before the OECD Convention or the UNCAC, the WTO was recommended as 
a forum for addressing corruption.58 It had an enforcement mechanism in place, 
and its members were major trading states—the very states most likely to be 
involved in corrupt international transactions.59 The actions proposed for the 
WTO were requiring member states to criminalize paying and receiving bribes 
and to bar slush funds.60 These proposals have come into existence. The OECD 
 
 48.  See Brewster, supra note 7, at 96 (“[F]or [a supply-side anti-bribery regime] to be effective, . . . 
[]most capital exporting states[] need to participate.”). 
 49.  Chaffee, supra note 30, at 724.  
 50.  Mark Pieth, From Talk to Action: The OECD Experience, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN 
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, supra note 8, at 151, 153. 
 51.  Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, ¶ 6.558, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005).  
52.    Joost Pauwelyn, Different Means, Same End: The Contribution of Trade and Investment Treaties 
to Anti-Corruption Policy, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A 
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE?, supra note 8, at 247, 255. 
 53.  General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183. 
 54.  Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 256. 
 55.  Revised Agreement on Government Procurement art. IV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, 1869 U.N.T.S. 508 [hereinafter GPA]. 
 56.  Sarlo, supra note 37, at 6. 
 57.  Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 256. 
 58.  Nichols, supra note 5, at 362. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 378, 380. 
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Convention requires states to criminalize paying bribes and to bar slush funds.61 
The UNCAC prohibits receiving bribes.62 What has not come to pass is an anti-
corruption treaty in a forum that provides enforcement. 
More recently, in light of the failure to enforce anti-corruption laws, it has 
been proposed that direct anti-corruption measures are failing; indirect methods 
of reducing corruption should therefore be used instead.63 Because the WTO 
provides for transparency and encourages good governance, it might be the best 
forum for indirect corruption reduction.64 The WTO’s culture of transparency 
and due process could help fight corruption, and the organization is well-
positioned to promote these goals.65 
Others have recommended enforcement by different international 
organizations. Though acknowledging a potential role for WTO involvement in 
anti-corruption, some have endorsed anti-corruption efforts in other fora. Some 
suggest delegating anti-corruption efforts to the UN because of the organization’s 
large membership,66 and others propose creating an entirely new international 
organization—one with an enforcement mechanism—to specifically target 
corruption.67 
A recent proposal for new approaches to reducing corruption supported 
forming an independent anti-corruption court.68 This court would be similar to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in that it would also be an international 
court that steps in when a state is either unwilling or unable to investigate and 
prosecute certain designated offenses.69 With independent prosecutors, judges, 
and investigators, this court would almost certainly enforce anti-corruption laws 
enthusiastically. But the proposed court has several flaws. A brand new court 
could be a hard sell. If the ICC itself is any indication, convincing states to 
acquiesce to a new forum for international judicial supervision is difficult.70 And 
the anti-corruption court would have jurisdiction over the demand side, not 
merely the supply side, thus it would be prosecuting states’ officials.71 This would 
intrude on sovereignty and might be more insulting to states than an instrument 
 
 61.  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1, 8, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 
[hereinafter OECD Convention].   
 62.  UNCAC art. 15, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 154. 
 63.  Ala’i, supra note 38, at 278. 
 64.  Id. at 260. 
 65.  Id. at 278. 
 66.  Bussen, supra note 15, at 510. 
 67.  Chaffee, supra note 30, at 723–24, 728. 
 68.  Mark L. Wolf, The Case for an International Anti-Corruption Court, GOVERNANCE STUDIES 
AT BROOKINGS 10 (July 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/inter 
national-anti-corruption-court-wolf/anticorruptioncourtwolffinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/76VY-2XRC].  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Matthew Stephenson, The Case Against an International Anti-Corruption Court, GAB: THE 
GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (July 31, 2014), http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/07/31/the-
case-against-an-international-anti-corruption-court/ [https://perma.cc/8GZC-PCZH].  
 71.  See Wolf, supra note 68, at 5–8.  
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that targets bribe-paying corporations.72 Trying to force reluctant states to accept 
an entirely new decisionmaking body that is powerful and has the ability to 
intrude on sovereignty could be too much too fast, thereby undermining the 
willingness of undecided parties to support reform efforts altogether.73 
In addition to alternative fora, there are other potential problems with the 
WTO as the forum for a new treaty against corruption. Most fundamentally, the 
WTO is an entity with a limited sphere of expertise; it does not purport to, nor 
should it have to deal with all international issues.74 Even if the WTO decided to 
enter the anti-corruption arena, corrupt states could use preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) to subvert WTO rules and promulgate corrupt schemes.75 
Assuming a new treaty is negotiated and the treaty requires enforcement, the 
level of enforcement required might be unclear.76 Thus, in a case before a WTO 
panel, the complaining party could insist that the treaty has been breached while 
the defending party could assert that it has met its obligations.77 Despite these 
alternative suggestions and potential problems, the WTO forum has the 
advantages of having a large membership and a well-respected existing dispute 
resolution mechanism. 
IV 
DIFFERENTIATING THE PROPOSED WTO TREATY FROM THE OECD ANTI-
BRIBERY CONVENTION AND THE UNCAC 
A. The OECD Convention 
Though it has strong legislation requirements, the OECD Convention has 
weak enforcement requirements. The OECD Convention is narrow in scope but 
relatively deep in commitment. It combines hard law and soft law.78 The OECD 
Convention is strict when it comes to enacting domestic laws.79 The language used 
makes criminalizing the bribing of a foreign government official mandatory.80 
Signatories must criminalize the act of bribing a foreign official—the hard law 
component.81 But signatories are left to their own devices to domestically enforce 
the written anti-bribery laws.82 The OECD’s only power to enforce the treaty 
obligations is monitoring each state’s compliance and issuing public reports—the 
 
 72.  Stephenson, supra note 70. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the 
World Trade Organization’s Authority, 28 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 711, 716 (1996).  
 75.  Sarlo, supra note 37. 
 76.  Brewster, supra note 7, at 103. 
 77.  See id. at 105 (raising the possibility that there would be no agreement as to what is a breach). 
 78.  Pieth, supra note 50, at 153. 
 79.  ABIOLA O. MAKINWA, PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 122 (2013). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  OECD Convention art. 1, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 4. 
 82.  OECD Convention art. 5, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5.  
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soft law name-and-shame component.83 
The OECD Convention is aimed only at bribery’s supply side.84 That is, the 
individuals and corporations that pay bribes to foreign government officials 
should, by the terms of the treaty, be criminals in their home states.85 The treaty 
does not address the demand side: it says nothing about the foreign government 
officials receiving bribes.86 Wealthy, developed countries whose corporations 
engage in business internationally comprise most of the OECD’s membership,87 
thus the supply-side-only design of the OECD Convention targets the actors over 
which the signatories have the most control. 
B. The UN Convention Against Corruption 
The UNCAC seeks to deal with a broad range of corrupt activities for a broad 
range of signatories, but its commitments are shallow and toothless. The UNCAC 
is broad in scope, addressing a variety of corrupt activities, but in many ways, it 
is aspirational. It has 140 signatories.88 It addresses both supply-side and demand-
side bribery.89 Some of the corrupt behaviors it condemns include private sector 
bribery, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, and abuse of functions.90 It 
emphasizes preventing corruption.91 And, when corruption is discovered, it 
permits asset recovery.92 
Commitments made under the UNCAC might not be as wide-ranging as they 
seem. Many corrupt behaviors are criminalized, optionally.93 Optional provisions 
include abuse of functions, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, private sector 
bribery, and private sector embezzlement, all of which states parties need merely 
“consider” criminalizing.94 Furthermore, to say that the UNCAC applies to both 
supply-side and demand-side bribery may be an overstatement because 
criminalizing demand-side bribery is optional under the UNCAC.95 Asset 
 
 83.  Bussen, supra note 15, at 494; Pieth, supra note 50, at 153. 
 84.  Spahn, supra note 47, at 11.  
 85.  See Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 259 (describing demand-side versus supply-side anti-bribery 
efforts). 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  List of OECD Member Countries, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-
oecd-member-countries.htm [https://perma.cc/UUG7-TV2Q] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 88.  United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 April 
2015, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html 
[https://perma.cc/G4YJ-EF9R]. 
 89.  UNCAC art. 15, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 154. 
 90.  UNCAC Chapter III, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 154–63. 
 91.  On prevention, see UNCAC Chapter II, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 148–54; Convention 
Highlights, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ treaties/CAC/ 
convention-highlights.html [https://perma.cc/PEG5-5HRP]. 
 92.  UNCAC arts. 31, 53, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 159–60, 175. 
 93.  Valsamis Mitsilegas, The European Union and the Rest of the World: Criminal Law and Policy 
Interconnections, in BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED LEGAL ORDERS 149, 163–65 (Malcolm Evans & Panos 
Koutrakos eds., 2011). 
 94.  UNCAC arts. 18–22, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 155–56. 
 95.  Chaffee, supra note 30, at 721–22.  
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recovery has the potential to deter criminal acts, but the UNCAC’s asset recovery 
is also not as strong as it would appear.96 Asset recovery is a technically complex 
endeavor; true expertise is needed to trace the source of assets.97 Because asset 
recovery is to be undertaken domestically,98 it will accomplish next to nothing in 
states without the resources to successfully recover assets.99 Though the UNCAC 
addresses a range of corrupt activities, it has no enforcement mechanism other 
than monitoring.100 There is no enforcing court or other body.101 And even the 
monitoring process is not “robust.”102 
C. The New Treaty Proposal 
The treaty this note recommends would contain elements of the OECD 
Convention and the UNCAC as well as additional, unique features. A new treaty 
negotiated at the WTO should focus narrowly on the supply side (like the OECD 
Convention), promote prevention (like the UNCAC), include substantive 
enforcement requirements, and provide for enforcement within the WTO DSM. 
Thus, for a signatory to both the UNCAC and the OECD Convention, the key 
differences will be that enforcement obligations are expressly written into the 
treaty103 and that the treaty can be enforced in an international forum. 
Negotiating this new anti-corruption treaty requires at least the significant 
capital exporters among the WTO’s many members to make a deep commitment. 
Having an international enforcement forum where they might be sanctioned 
probably means that WTO members will hesitate to commit to too much. So a 
narrower commitment, such as criminalizing only the act of bribing a foreign 
government official, would likely prove more successful than a broad 
commitment. States and corporations interested in leveling the playing field by 
preventing competitors from bribing, corporations interested in reducing costs, 
and states and other actors interested in eliminating corruption on principle 
might support a new treaty, as they did the OECD Convention.104 If these 
supporters of the OECD Convention were hoping that it would result in reduced 
corruption,105 they could be disappointed by the low level of enforcement and the 
likely limited effects of the OECD Convention on reducing bribery. A treaty that 
promises enforcement could thus be appealing. 
 
 96.  Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 
206–12 (2005). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  UNCAC arts. 53, 31, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 159–60, 175. 
 99.  Webb, supra note 96, at 206–12. 
 100.  Bussen, supra note 15, at 494. 
 101.  Webb, supra note 96, at 222–29. 
 102.  Id. at 228. 
 103.  See Brewster, supra note 7, at 93 (current OECD Convention enforcement obligations are 
ambiguous). 
 104.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the 
Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 145–47 (2002) (describing the actors and related 
interests involved in developing the OECD Convention). 
 105.  See id. 
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In addition to being a narrower and therefore more palatable commitment, 
criminalizing only supply-side bribery avoids an entirely different problem—
infringing on sovereignty.106 Similar to states parties to the OECD Convention, 
WTO members would need to enact domestic laws prohibiting individuals and 
corporations from paying bribes to foreign government officials.107 They would 
also be required to enforce those laws barring supply-side bribery, as described 
below. But, what they would not be required to do is criminalize demand-side 
bribery by proscribing a government official’s acceptance of a bribe. Obliging 
states to criminalize accepting bribes together with enforcing this commitment to 
impose criminal sanctions on government officials at an international forum 
would intrude on each state’s sovereignty.108 
In addition to requiring states to criminalize supply-side foreign bribery, this 
new treaty would prioritize prevention. The goal of the treaty is to reduce 
corruption; it should therefore not rely on deterrence in the form of greater 
enforcement to achieve that end. Preventive efforts could help curb corruption, 
too. A books and records requirement that makes hiding foreign bribery more 
difficult, like the books and records requirements of the OECD Convention and 
the UNCAC,109 would be a helpful preventive effort. Another preventive effort 
comes from the UNCAC, which recommends encouraging private sector codes 
of conduct.110 Corporations could be encouraged to craft internal codes of 
conduct. Participating in their regulation might motivate corporations to take the 
anti-bribery laws seriously.111 A third preventive effort would be awareness-
raising. OECD country monitoring reports assert that simple lack of awareness 
of the crime of foreign bribery impedes enforcement.112 To ensure that 
corporations, individuals, and law enforcement personnel are aware of not only 
the crime of foreign bribery but also the detrimental effects of corruption, each 
signatory could be obliged to engage in awareness-raising efforts. As an example, 
a state could run a public service ad campaign. 
Furthermore, this treaty would include substantive enforcement 
requirements. The treaty would mandate that each state not only enact but also 
enforce anti-bribery laws. States parties would be obliged to comply—in good 
faith—with certain standards of adequate enforcement. These standards could 
borrow from some of the indicators of enforcement or lack thereof examined by 
 
 106.  Bussen, supra note 15, at 511. 
 107.  See OECD Convention arts. 1, 2, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 4 (requiring that states parties enact 
legislation criminalizing foreign bribery on the part of legal or natural persons). 
 108.  Bussen, supra note 15, at 511 (recommending against enforcement of passive bribery because it 
intrudes on sovereignty). 
 109.  OECD Convention art. 8, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5; UNCAC art. 12 ¶ 3, supra note 4, 2349 
U.N.T.S. at 152.   
 110.  UNCAC art. 12, ¶ 2(b), supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 151. 
 111.  Delaney, supra note 3, at 459. 
 112.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL 5 (2013) [hereinafter PORTUGAL PHASE 3], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Portugalphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEX5-S6PZ] (highlighting the lack of 
awareness). 
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the OECD when it conducts its country monitoring investigations to assess states’ 
enforcement of the OECD Convention.113 In this treaty, unlike the OECD 
Convention, these standards and the good faith requirement would be explicitly 
set out in the treaty. 
First, each state would be obliged to address a majority of the bribery 
allegations of which it had notice.114 Addressing one of these foreign bribery 
allegations could mean anything from a thorough investigation to a prosecution 
that ends in a settlement agreement to a conviction.115 Reports of a state’s 
corporation or other national bribing public officials abroad could surface either 
in the media or as told by a whistleblower. After this type of evidence becomes 
public or otherwise known to the state, it would have a duty to address the 
allegation against the offending corporation. 
Second, a certain amount of resources would have to be dedicated to 
prosecuting foreign bribery. OECD reports consider the resources put into 
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery as well as the expertise of those 
involved in investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery.116 Similarly, this new 
treaty would oblige states parties to devote resources to investigating and 
prosecuting foreign bribery and to implement foreign-bribery-specific training 
for police and prosecutors. Perhaps states could commit to spending the same 
percent of their law enforcement budget as is spent on domestic bribery on 
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery.117 If domestic bribery is not part of 
 
 113.  Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/4GU2-4ZZJ] 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
 114.  See, e.g., PORTUGAL PHASE 3, supra note 112, at 21–34 (discussing investigation and prosecution 
of bribery as an indicator of sufficient enforcement). 
 115.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN DENMARK 27–28 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Denmarkphase 
3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5ZH-BPJA] (raising concerns that Denmark is closing cases without 
thoroughly investigating them); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-
BRIBERY CONVENTION IN GREECE 19–21 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/Greecephase 
3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SNR-WXCW] (highlighting an instance when Greece did not open an 
investigation following an allegation). 
 116.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN BELGIUM 32 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/BelgiumPhase3 
ReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3Z3-BWHG] (noting that Belgium’s enforcement of its anti-bribery 
laws suffers from a “flagrant lack of resources”); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE 
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN ICELAND 16 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/Icelandphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5FH-8QDK] (noting that 
investigators with more expertise are needed and that specialized training on foreign bribery has not been 
provided to either the judiciary or the law enforcement personnel); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON 
IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN ARGENTINA 30 (2014) [hereinafter 
ARGENTINA PHASE 3],  http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Argentina-Phase-3-Report-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QE2L-GWGZ] (specialized judges and prosecutors exist for domestic, but not foreign 
bribery cases); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
IN LUXEMBOURG 34 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Luxembourg 
phase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD4F-U7WV] (there is an increasing but still small number of 
foreign bribery specialists).  
 117.  See, e.g., ARGENTINA PHASE 3, supra note 116, at 30 (specialized judges and prosecutors exist 
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the law enforcement budget, a state could devote the same percent of the budget 
as is spent on another economic crime, such as money laundering. As an 
alternative, the treaty could establish as a floor a certain default percent of the 
law enforcement budget that would have to be dedicated to investigating and 
prosecuting foreign bribery. This would preclude the possibility that a state could 
cut funding for other economic crimes to avoid funding anti-bribery. States would 
also be required to take steps for their prosecutors and police to attain an 
appropriate level of expertise on the crime of foreign bribery. States would have 
to staff a prosecutor’s office and a police unit specializing in foreign bribery, or 
at least in economic crimes.118 And training on the crime of foreign bribery and 
its elements would have to be provided to all prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials.119 
Third, like the OECD Convention, prosecutors, police, and judges who work 
on anti-bribery matters would not be permitted to be subject to political control, 
nor would prosecutors be allowed to consider economic factors when deciding 
whether to pursue a particular investigation. The OECD Convention prohibits 
judges, prosecutors, and police from considering the “national economic 
interest” when evaluating a foreign bribery case.120 This treaty would implement 
the same requirement. The national economic interest seems to be problematic 
in two situations. The first is when prosecutorial discretion rests on a 
determination of whether prosecution is in the “public interest.”121 In this case, it 
is not necessarily clear that the national economic interest should not be part of 
the public interest.122 The second is when prosecutors are either actually 
permitted or are perceived to be permitted to take the national economic interest 
into account.123 Both of those examples would be barred by this treaty. Further, 
 
for domestic, but not foreign bribery cases); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD 
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN SLOVENIA 9 (2014) [hereinafter SLOVENIA PHASE 3], 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SloveniaPhase3ReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L8E-733Y] 
(prioritizing combating domestic, but not foreign corruption). 
 118.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN BULGARIA 21, 23 (2011),  http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-bribery 
convention/Bulgariaphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP6H-QFB9] (explaining that Bulgaria has 
no specialists for complex economic crimes and is not capable of conducting a complex financial 
investigation, describing general challenges of conducting complex financial investigation, like a foreign 
bribery investigation). 
 119.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2010),  http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-bribery 
convention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TXJ-WSUL] (noting the specialized 
training provided to various agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act). 
 120.  OECD Convention art. 5, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5.  
 121.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN SWEDEN 29 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Swedenphase3reportEN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3W84-UN87] (discussing the implications of the “public interest” standard that has not 
been explicitly stated not to include the national economic interest). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See, e.g., SLOVENIA PHASE 3, supra note 117, at 30 (discussing the perception that prosecutors 
are allowed to consider economic impact); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD 
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when engaging in country monitoring for compliance, the OECD examines 
whether a country’s judges, prosecutors, or police are subject to political 
influence.124 This new treaty would require both that legal safeguards to 
independence be put in place and that judges, prosecutors, and police be 
independent in practice. For example, elected officials contacting law 
enforcement personnel to discuss particular, ongoing foreign bribery cases 
amounts to political influence.125 Moreover, when the police, prosecutors, and 
judges are under the supervision or control of a political body or are not legally 
guaranteed independence, they are subject to political influence.126 Both 
examples would be prohibited by the new treaty. 
Finally, this treaty would come with an already existing enforcement forum—
the WTO DSM. Instead of merely monitoring countries that fail to prosecute 
bribery, the new treaty would allow other countries to enforce their obligations 
formally and internationally. This would increase incentives to prosecute bribery 
domestically, because states could feel more confident that other states are 
actually prosecuting bribery and because they would not want to have these 
treaty obligations enforced against them in a visible forum. 
V 
WTO TREATY FEATURES: STANDING, BREACH, AND REMEDIES 
A. Standing 
States would be the only group with standing to sue under this new anti-
corruption treaty. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
contemplates only member states having standing to sue and be sued.127 The 
states are limited to making claims against state action.128 Thus, this new treaty 
would be limited to allowing states to have standing to sue. 
One question that arises is what incentive a state would have to sue on 
corruption grounds.129 But even without an international forum, states with 
 
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 34–35 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/SouthAfricaPhase3ReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8H2-P7FV] (though it has been amended, 
South Africa required prosecutors to consider economic impact in the past). 
 124.  See, e.g., ARGENTINA PHASE 3, supra note 116, at 33 (2014). 
 125.  See, e.g., id. 
 126.  See, e.g., id. at 35–37 (examining whether judges were independent); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT 
ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN BRAZIL 42–43 (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Brazil-Phase-3-Report-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJM2-PMMD] 
(evaluating the independence of various law enforcement institutions involved in investigating and 
prosecuting foreign bribery); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 30 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/CzechRepublicphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/R65L-LT92] (prosecutor’s office subject 
to political oversight). 
 127.  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter DSU]. 
 128.  Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 261. 
 129.  Id. 
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robust enforcement frequently sue foreign individuals and corporations in 
domestic courts.130 These states want other states to obey anti-corruption laws 
and currently use domestic enforcement to encourage a level, non-corrupt 
playing field.131 It thus seems likely that the same enthusiastic enforcer states 
would use the WTO forum as an additional—perhaps better—platform not 
subject to domestic jurisdictional restraints for promoting uniformity in the 
enforcement of anti-corruption laws. 
If standing were extended to a wider group of actors, perhaps including 
private individuals and corporations, it could take a couple of different forms. 
Private citizens could sue in foreign domestic courts, standing in for their 
government.132 Or corruption disputes could follow the model for investment 
disputes, which permits corporations to bring arbitral proceedings against 
states.133 Indeed, a domestic private right of action is supposed to exist already; 
Article 35 of the UNCAC should have created such a right of action for victims 
of corruption.134 Perhaps involving private parties, which are likely to have 
incentives to sue, especially when they suspect that they have lost business that 
another party won by corrupt measures, would increase anti-corruption 
enforcement. But that would require a new tribunal or new procedures in various 
domestic courts. 
Although the WTO does not permit all interested parties to have standing, it 
does provide an established, often-used tribunal. Whether domestic courts would 
actually allow the suggested proceedings or whether parties would actually use 
some new tribunal is unknown. What is known is that parties use and respect the 
WTO DSM, giving it a strong advantage in enforcing anti-corruption laws. 
B. Breach 
Noncompliance with the enforcement requirements could manifest itself in 
different ways. States parties could breach the treaty by failing to meet any of the 
preventive, legislative, or enforcement requirements. This section will focus on 
breaches of the enforcement requirements. To breach the enforcement 
requirements, a country could fail to address most of the foreign bribery 
allegations of which it was on notice, or it could fail to address one particularly 
high profile allegation; a country could provide inadequate enforcement 
resources, including monetary resources, training, and expertise; or a country 
could allow consideration of economic factors or allow its police, prosecutors, 
and judges to be politically influenced. 
Almost inevitably, the parties will disagree on whether the action or inaction 
amounted to a breach. When a claim of breach is brought against a state at the 
 
 130.  Bussen, supra note 15, at 496. 
 131.  See Brewster, supra note 7, at 99–101 (2014). 
 132.  Paul D. Carrington, Private Enforcement of International Law, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: 
CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, supra note 8, at 285, 285. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  UNCAC art. 35, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 161; MAKINWA, supra note 79, at 369–70. 
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WTO on the grounds of failure to address a foreign bribery allegation, the 
responding state could deny the claim and offer explanations of why it did not 
investigate and prosecute a particular individual or corporation. Perhaps it was 
not a significant case, or simultaneously some other significant case needed more 
resources. Perhaps the corporation was particularly sympathetic and had recently 
imposed a new, more stringent code of conduct that had not yet taken hold. As 
in domestic court cases, whether a breach occurred would be a question of fact 
for the WTO Panel to resolve.  
Furthermore, the substantive enforcement obligations imposed by the treaty 
will provide guidance as to what constitutes a breach. This might alleviate the 
problem of figuring out what constitutes a treaty breach in the case of 
enforcement.135 For example, a respondent state would breach the treaty if it 
failed to provide specific foreign anti-bribery training to its police and 
prosecutors, or if it provided either funding below the default amount required 
or less funding to foreign anti-bribery laws than to domestic anti-bribery laws. A 
state would also be in breach of its treaty obligations if it allowed its prosecutors 
or police to consider the “national economic interest”136 or if it did not permit 
prosecutors, police, or judges to act independently and without political control. 
These claims might be more challenging for a complaining state to prove, given 
the potentially subtle and difficult-to-detect ways in which police, prosecutors, 
and judges can factor in the “national economic interest” or take into account 
political influence. 
Complainant states could bring claims based on either patterns of not 
enforcing the anti-corruption laws or based on a single (likely high-profile) 
instance of not enforcing the anti-corruption laws. Because proof of lack of 
enforcement could be difficult in a one-off situation, claims would probably be 
brought based on patterns of failure to enforce the anti-corruption laws. For 
patterns of failure to meet the enforcement obligations, breach would likely be 
easier to prove because several obligations might have been breached. There 
could be evidence suggesting that prosecutors are taking the national economic 
interest into account or are subject to de facto political control, such as a high 
number of allegations involving major national corporations but not a 
correspondingly high number of investigations or prosecutions of those 
corporations.137 But proving this type of claim would nonetheless be challenging, 
because even indicative evidence would not definitively prove that prosecutors 
are, in practice, allowed to consider economic factors or that government officials 
exercise de facto control over foreign bribery cases. However, if the complaining 
state could prove breach of a more objective standard, such as failing to meet the 
 
 135.  See Brewster, supra note 7, at 105 (raising the question of how to determine breach and what 
happens if the parties do not agree about what a breach is). 
 136.  OECD Convention art. 5, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5. 
 137.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN SPAIN 41 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Spainphase3reportEN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RP4X-R9HY] (questioning prosecutorial independence because of the low number of 
investigations and lack of prosecutions).   
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amount of resources threshold, it would still succeed in its claim. 
In addition to a claim for breach, states could bring a claim for non-violation. 
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), states are allowed 
to bring claims even when treaty obligations have not necessarily been 
breached.138 There are three elements to a non-violation claim under the GATT: 
“(1) application of a measure by a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under 
the relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or impairment of the benefit as the 
result of the application of the measure.”139 The claim in a non-violation case is 
typically that the complaining party had “legitimate expectations of improved 
market-access opportunities” that were thwarted by the responding party’s 
actions.140 
This treaty could echo the GATT and allow non-violation claims. Two 
examples of situations that could give rise to a non-violation claim under this 
treaty are as follows. First, under this proposed treaty, countries would have a 
duty to address a majority of foreign bribery allegations when on notice. Those 
that do not want to meaningfully address foreign bribery allegations might 
dismiss allegations out of hand as unreliable or close investigations too quickly.141 
Moreover, they could quickly destroy records of what happened with a closed 
investigation so that it would be difficult to tell whether the investigation was 
conducted thoroughly and in good faith.142 These actions might not amount to a 
breach of the treaty, but they could thwart legitimate expectations that the 
complaining country’s corporations would have the chance to compete honestly 
for foreign government contracts. 
Second, states would be required to guarantee the independence of police, 
prosecutors, and judges, and to bar consideration of economic factors. This could 
be another area in which states could nominally comply with their obligations 
while subverting them in practice. A given state could legally guarantee 
independence while subtly using political influence in practice. In this situation, 
the available indicators would probably be a series of cases against high-profile 
companies and individuals that have been closed early or dropped before 
prosecution.143 This type of situation leads working groups conducting OECD 
country-monitoring evaluations to believe that either those responsible for 
 
 138.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIII, ¶ 1(b), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 139.  Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, ¶ 10.41, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998). 
 140.  Id. at ¶¶ 10.41, 10.61. 
 141.  See, e.g., PORTUGAL PHASE 3, supra note 112, at 22–24 (many cases were closed after 
preliminary investigations and in some cases, no inquiries were made).  
 142.  See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN KOREA 11–12 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconvention/ 
Koreaphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3C3-RPYT] (Korea routinely destroys case records after 
a certain period of time).  
 143.  PORTUGAL PHASE 3, supra note 112, at 28–29 (indicating the Working Group’s concern that 
there were many cases involving high-profile persons and corporations, none of which have been 
prosecuted). 
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investigation and prosecution are considering economic factors or that the same 
people are being improperly influenced by government officials.144 There might 
not be enough evidence to prove that states are breaching their obligations. And 
perhaps the behavior is sufficiently ambiguous that it would not amount to a 
breach even with perfect evidence. But if enough cases involving high-profile 
companies and individuals are dropped or closed before prosecution, a 
complaining state would at least be able to argue that this state is undermining 
legitimate expectations. 
C. Remedies 
Remedying corruption at the WTO is difficult, and no option is without flaws. 
Nonetheless, there are several options for remedies at the WTO. Initially, if a 
Panel or Appellate Body report finds a member state noncompliant, the member 
state is given a certain amount of time during which it is supposed to bring its 
actions into compliance.145 Bringing its actions into compliance in the future 
should mean that the noncompliant state thoroughly investigates and perhaps 
prosecutes the next allegation of foreign bribery by a national. The reasonable 
period of time, which is the time allowed by the WTO for the noncompliant state 
to bring its actions into appropriate compliance,146 should therefore be the time 
it takes for a new, credible allegation to surface plus the time a thorough 
investigation would take. 
If the noncompliant state remains noncompliant after the reasonable period 
of time, then the complaining country can bring the case back to the WTO and a 
Compliance Panel can assess remedies.147 The WTO allows “suspension of 
concessions” by the complaining state, meaning that retaliation in the form of 
trade sanctions may be imposed.148 If the source of the bribery could be proven, 
that is, whether the instance of bribery could be best categorized as trade in goods 
or trade in services, then concessions could be suspended in the same sector.149 
Otherwise, concessions could be suspended in any of the agreements.150 
A difficult issue is how the level of nullification or impairment is to be 
determined. Remedies must be “equivalent to the level of nullification or 
impairment.”151 This means that a state is permitted to retaliate up to the amount 
by which the noncompliant state’s actions have caused nullification or 
impairment of the anticipated benefits of trade. That level is calculated by 
 
 144.  See, e.g., id. (the Working Group was worried that economic or political factors were influencing 
the prosecutors involved in these cases). 
 145.  DSU art. 21.3.  
 146.  DSU art. 21. 
 147.  DSU art. 22.2, 22.3. 
 148.  DSU art. 22.2.  
 149.  See DSU art. 22.3 (articulating the principle that concessions should be suspended in the same 
agreement if possible, but can be suspended in other agreements). 
 150.  See DSU art. 22.3. 
 151.  DSU art. 22.4. 
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assessing the lost trade flows caused by the noncompliant state’s actions.152 
Ultimately, it is up to a WTO decisionmaker to decide the amount by which the 
complaining state has lost trade flows, and, accordingly, the level of retaliation 
that the complaining state is permitted to impose.153 Therefore, valuing 
nullification and impairment is central to imposing remedies. 
One possible claim would be that the complaining country was deprived of 
the opportunity to bid honestly. Then, the way to calculate the level of 
nullification or impairment is to value the lost opportunity of the complaining 
country, whose national presumably lost a bid for a project to the respondent 
country’s national. Under the present WTO case law, lost opportunity cannot be 
used as the measure for nullification and impairment, because it is unknown 
whether the complaining country would otherwise have won the contract, thus 
the lost opportunity is merely speculative.154 However, treaties are allowed to 
create special rules for dispute settlement that trump the usual rules set forth in 
the DSU.155 This treaty could provide that nullification and impairment includes 
lost opportunity, thus overriding the existing case law only for disputes arising 
under this treaty. The Compliance Panel would then assume that the complainant 
country would have won the bid but for the bribery, and evaluate the value of the 
lost opportunity. The major challenge of this method is valuing lost opportunity. 
The Compliance Panel could look at the actual benefits that accrued to the 
company that won the bid as a benchmark, but that does not necessarily represent 
the lost opportunity. Due to the nature of this remedy—that it represents the lost 
opportunity from a particular bid—it would be a one-time, lump-sum amount 
rather than an annual amount. Although valuation would be difficult, this remedy 
assessment is probably the best fit for the WTO, because it corresponds to the 
idea of nullification and impairment being the lost trade flows from a violation of 
WTO law. 
Perhaps another solution is to borrow a private contract remedy. Contract 
price adjustment has been suggested as a corruption remedy.156 This would adjust 
the price of the contract tainted by bribery to the non-bribery price of the same 
contract.157 A similar assessment could be used to determine the level of 
nullification and impairment. The disputing parties could offer evidence on the 
non-bribery price of various contracts and transactions, and the Compliance 
Panel could then determine the level of nullification and impairment from this 
amount. One problem with this method is that the remedies at the WTO are 
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meant to be based on lost trade flows, and this method values overpayment of 
contracts but not lost trade flows. It is also difficult to assess the value of similar, 
honest contracts, because parties can contest what qualifies as a similar contract 
and can question whether some other example contract was also the result of 
bribery. 
Perhaps for proven systemic failure to comply with anti-corruption 
enforcement obligations, corporations and persons from the violator’s state could 
be barred from bidding on government projects of other WTO member states.158 
This remedy could be reserved for particularly egregious offenders. But this 
method also has its downsides. Harsh as it seems, it is easy to circumvent. These 
companies could simply form new subsidiaries in other locations and use those to 
bid on projects. 
One difficulty with the WTO remedy structure as a whole is that it is purely 
prospective. Thus, it has the potential to resolve systemic non-enforcement of 
anti-corruption obligations but cannot remedy a one-off instance of corruption.159 
A state could, therefore, let a few instances of corruption slide without 
repercussions, as long as it returns to compliance. This problem—the so-called 
“remedy gap”—is inherent in all WTO disputes.160 A state can begin violating a 
WTO agreement and can continue to do so until not only a claim is brought to 
the DSM but also a decision of noncompliance is made and a subsequent 
reasonable period of time has passed.161 At this point, the state could simply come 
back to compliance and suffer no remedial consequences.162 Even if the state 
continues to breach its obligations and is brought to a Compliance Panel that 
assesses remedies and permits retaliation against the state, the state will be 
subject to that retaliation only going forward.163 It does not have to provide 
compensation for past violations.164 And the retaliation is only for present 
noncompliance starting from the end of the reasonable period of time, not for the 
prior noncompliance that resulted in the adverse ruling in the first place.165 But, 
even if no remedy is truly satisfactory, there are other factors that motivate 
compliance with WTO treaties. 
Notably, WTO member states do not exploit the remedy gap as frequently as 
they could.166 This is likely because the powerful countries that most influenced 
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the system’s structure also receive the most benefit from the WTO’s rules.167 
Therefore, these states have an incentive to follow the rules themselves and to 
wield their power to induce other states to do the same.168 
Reputational effects likely also influence the behavior of WTO member 
states.169 Most cases brought at the WTO settle instead of moving forward to a 
panel ruling.170 The WTO, as an international forum for resolving disputes, can 
“brand violating parties as being uncooperative treaty partners.”171 Because the 
WTO offers only prospective remedies that might not deter breaches of WTO 
law, there are likely other factors that encourage compliance with WTO 
treaties.172 The vast majority of WTO DSM rulings are in favor of the complaining 
party, thus the responding party might feel political pressure to settle rather than 
risk being publicly named a violator of treaties.173 States that are less embedded 
in the international trade system feel the most reputational pressure and, 
accordingly, settle the earliest and most often.174 They still hope to enter into 
many future treaties and join other international organizations.175 Potential treaty 
partners might not want to enter into an agreement with a bad treaty partner.176 
Therefore, being labeled a violator could have serious repercussions for a state 
trying to negotiate a new agreement or join an international organization.177 
Meanwhile, states that are embedded in the international trade system are 
already party to many treaties and belong to many international organizations.178 
Future opportunities for entering into a new agreement are limited.179 Thus, 
reputational concerns are not felt as strongly by these states.180 
It is possible that a country’s embarrassment over having a WTO report 
publicly declare that it is not enforcing its anti-bribery laws would be sufficient to 
convince it to come into compliance. In that case, remedies would not come into 
play at all. If reputational concerns can induce settlement, then perhaps they can 
induce compliance post-report adoption, too.181 
States might not exploit the remedy gap as much as they could, and 
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reputational concerns probably deter breach without need for remedies. 
Nonetheless, breaches of WTO obligations do happen. But, even if some 
instances of lack of punishment of corruption cannot be remedied or deterred, 
remedies that target and deter systemic lack of punishment of corruption will 
nonetheless reduce corruption. Corruption can never be eliminated, but it can be 
reduced. If the WTO can achieve reduction, it will have done enough. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The current international anti-corruption approach has resulted in growing 
awareness that corruption is a real problem rather than a necessary, if unsavory, 
transaction cost. It has also improved coordination of domestic legislation; states 
parties to the UNCAC or the OECD Convention have similar anti-corruption 
laws. Yet there is still room for improvement. Enforcement levels remain low. 
Enforcement is presently domestic only, and what it means to enforce the anti-
bribery laws of a treaty is unclear. 
This note proposed a new treaty as a solution to one part of the enforcement 
problem. The new, recommended treaty would target a specific corruption 
problem—supply-side foreign bribery. This would not be the first treaty to target 
this facet of corruption, but its new features could build upon and improve the 
existing framework. Not only would legislation be required, but enforcement 
would be required as well. The treaty would offer guidance on what level of 
enforcement countries are obliged to reach, eliminating some uncertainty. 
Furthermore, this treaty would come with the WTO’s DSM, so parties could use 
an international dispute settlement forum to enforce enforcement. The 
substantive enforcement requirements together with the international forum at 
which other states can file complaints against a breaching state could make higher 
levels of enforcement a real possibility. Improving enforcement of supply-side 
foreign bribery laws is only one aspect of reducing corruption. But decreasing 
corruption is difficult to do all at once. This proposed treaty could be one more 
step in the right direction—towards a more uniform, consistent, and effective 
international anti-corruption regime. 
